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A commentary on
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
by Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1983). Psychol. Rev. 90, 293–315. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.90.4.293
The “Linda problem” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) is arguably one of the best-known examples
of how people commit the conjunction fallacy (cited 1100 times in Web of Science as of November
2015). In this broadly recognized experiment, more than 80 percent of participants failed to
recognize the conjunction rule, one of the most fundamental statistical laws, which expresses that
the probability of both “A” and “B” being true cannot be higher than the probability of “A” alone
being true.
This commentary provides possible alternative accounts of the conjunction fallacy in the
Linda problem in light of bounded rationality theory and “nudging” (or “libertarian paternalism,”
Gigerenzer, 2015) and generates novel hypotheses in the domain of experimental psychology.
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) have long argued that humans do not reason rationally and are
subject to many “cognitive illusions,” such as overconfidence bias, contingency illusions or the false
consensus effect. One such cognitive illusion is the conjunction fallacy from the Linda problem.
However, this view has been challenged; for instance, Gigerenzer and his colleague (Hertwig and
Gigerenzer, 1999) claim that this conjunction “error” may result from the human capacity for
inferring additional semantic information from social situations and not from “flaws” in human
cognition, as Tversky and Kahneman would argue.
We argue that usually, at the initial encounter between two strangers, more rather than less
information about the other person is preferable, as a means to better manage self-image and know
how to behave and how to present oneself. Given these premises, two pieces of information as
opposed to one piece can be preferred in the Linda problem. Therefore, if one can establish two
details about a person instead of only one, the more encompassing description of a person should
be chosen more frequently. Imagining a version of Linda in which she is a bank teller and quite
probably an active feminist, we think, is presumably easier than imagining that she is only a bank
teller—though with many other unaccounted for or “left-over” attributes, such as older than 30,
outspoken, a participant in demonstrations, etc., (also see original description of Linda in Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983).
Furthermore, there seemingly have been no studies checking whether the word “active”
contributes to people’s preference for the presentation of Linda as a bank teller and active in the
feminist movement. After all, her description perfectly fits someone being active in some kind of
movement, not necessarily that she is active specifically in a feminist movement. When asked to
imagine a meeting with the Linda described in the Linda problem, perhaps many people would
visualize a bright, mature woman who is an active participant in some undefined social movement,
based solely on her mentioned involvement in various demonstrations.
Another argument in defense of purposely violating the statistical rule of conjunction is
the speed and frugality of heuristics. For most people, committing the conjunction fallacy in
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the semantically rich environment of the Linda problem
may be inadvertently preferable to a choice based on purely
logical reasoning. Assessing one’s “identity” in a manner that
is both quickly produced and quickly retrieved later could
hypothetically be an adaptive strategy for the contemporary
human environment, as opposed to obeying laws of statistics
through elaborate, lengthy descriptions.
Yet another experiment likely to produce useful, interesting
results would consist of asking participants to depict Linda
in one, two, three, four or more adjectives that were not
explicitly mentioned in the original description (e.g., being a
bank teller, an active feminist, being a wife) and inform them
that a more compressed summary is better. If the experiment
reveals a preference for details being compressed into more
than one word, then it might be argued that people opt to
have a more complex image of a person, rather than singular
attributes. Such a result would partly explain why choosing
the description of Linda as bank teller and active feminist is
more preferred than the description of Linda as merely a bank
teller.
Critically, many others (e.g., Moro, 2009; Tentori and Crupi,
2012) argued that the conjunction fallacy is a genuine error of
reasoning bias and not a mere misunderstanding. For example,
research showed that people are willing to choose conjunctive
bets over more likely bets, even though transparent presentations
conditions are assured (e.g., Bonini et al., 2004; Nilsson and
Andersson, 2010). Still, recent evidence offers an alternative
account—such biases might have been instilled and cued in
bettors through bookmakers’ common strategy of almost solely
advertising such special conjunctive bets, resulting in the
representativeness heuristic in bettors (see Newall, 2015). To
conclude—if a choice must be made, perhaps it is better to
consider people as influenced by environmental “nudges” rather
than as biased and unreasonable beings per se.
Our conclusion is that people supposedly exhibit a substantial
amount of flawed reasoning, such as the conjunction fallacy.
This is true. However, what is also likely true is that this
flawed reasoning is not only possibly “inherent” or that we
are biased because our cognitive capacities are limited, but
because there are many environmental factors influencing those
cognitive capacities. For example, different characteristics of
learning environments can cue specificmotivational states, which
in turn affect learning outcomes (see Lewinski, 2015a for a
review). A similar phenomenon occurs in emotion research
where automated facial coding software (Lewinski et al., 2014)
can outperform people in recognizing neutral faces as neutral
because people are socialized into seeing facial emotions that
are not there, whereas software is not (Lewinski, 2015b).
Therefore, we might be “nudged” to commit those fallacies,
including conjunction fallacy, such as bookmakers bombarding
their clients with bets of low outcome probability or big
multinationals spending billions of dollars to make sure people
commit fallacies (e.g., see Gigerenzer, 2015). Conjunction fallacy
is irrational, but the size of this irrationality could be smaller
if people’s environmental and social reality was constructed
in such a way that it diminishes those fallacies (and people
approve of that if choice architecture is designed toward
specifically benefiting individuals and society; Junghans et al.,
2015).
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